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ASHBACKER RITES IN ADMINISTRATNE PRACTICE:
A CASE STUDY OF BROADCAST REGULATION
JACOB W. MAYER*
&
MICHAEL BOTEIN**

When more than one party applies to a federal administrative
agency for an instrument of authorization which cannot be granted
to all applicants-i.e., the applications are "mutually exclusive"each applicant, in order to protect its interests, generally must
have an opportunity to participate in any proceedings involving the
competing applications. l Mutual exclusivity arises most familiarly,
of course, in the contexts of broadcast stations and airline routes.
The federal courts have, with increasing frequency, set minimum
standards of participation in comparative proceedings on mutually
exclusive applications in order to assure fair treatment to all applicants.
Judicial review of agency consolidation procedures developed
in the wake of Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC. 2 Extensive development of the Ashbacker doctrine has occurred in broadcast
licensing proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission. 3 A survey of the Commission's experience provides some
insight into the problems involved in administration of the doc-

* Member, District of Columbia Bar. B.S. 1954, J.D. 1957, University of Kentucky;
LL.M. 1958, George Washington University.
** Director, Communications Media Center, New York Law School. B.A. 1966,
Wesleyan University; J.D. 1969, Cornell University; LL.M. 1972, Columbia University.
1. These comparative hearings, resulting from some form of mutual exclusivity,
naturally are quite distinct from petitions to deny an authorization on the ground that
an incumbent licensee has defaulted -on its public interest obligations. Petitions to
deny renewal applications offer an important tool to groups attempting to gain concessions from broadcasters in regard to programming and employment policies. See
Schneyer, An Overview of Public Interest Law Activity in the Communications
Field, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 619, 623.
2. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
3. Naturally, other agencies have also had to cope with Ashbacker. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 389 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826
(1968); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The CAB's experiences in applying Ashbacker to route certification proceedings are competently
analyzed in Note, The Ashbacker Rule and the CAB: Cumbersome Procedure v. Public Interest, 44 VA. L. REv. 1147 (1958).
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trine; after all, the Commission has had the longest experience
with the doctrine and has experimented with a variety of approaches designed to limit the impact of Ashbacker on FCC administrative processes.

I. BIRTH OF THE DOCTRINE
Ashbacker arose as a result of an application, in March 1944,
by the Fetzer Broadcasting Company for a new AM station in
Grand Rapids, Michigan, on a frequency of 1230 kiloherti. Two
months later, Ashbacker Radio Corporation filed an application to
change the frequency of its station in nearby Muskegon, Michigan,
from 1490 kilohertz to 1230 kilohertz. Operation on this new frequency would have created "intolerable" electrical interference
with the proposed Fetzer station, making both stations' signals impossible to receive over a wide area. In June 1944, the Commission, declaring the applications to be "actually exclusive," granted
Fetzer's application and designated Ashbacker's for a subsequent
hearing. In order to prevail at that hearing, Ashbacker would have
been required to show that its proposed operation would better
serve the public interest than would Fetzer's, but the Commission
nevertheless denied Ashbacker's petition for reconsideration of the
grant to Fetzer on the ground that Ashbacker's application had not
yet been rejected and would be afforded a full hearing before the
Commission. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's action. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, treated the problem as one of
reconciling the internally inconsistent provisions of section 309(a) of
the Communications Act of 19345 in relation to mutually exclusive
4. 326 U.S. at 328-29.
5 The statute in effect at the time of the Ashbacker decision was the original
version of section 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch.
652, § 309(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1085 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (e)
(1970». It provided that:
If upon examination of any application for a station license or for the renewal or modification of a station license the Commission shall determine
that public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall authorize the issuance, renewal, or modification thereof
in accordance with said finding. In the event the Commission upon examination of any such application does not reach such decision with respect
thereto, it shall notify the applicant thereof, shall fix and give notice of a
time and place for hearing thereon, and shall afford such applicant an opportunity to be heard under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.
Under current law, when the Commission designates competing applications for a
hearing, it acts pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (e) (1970).
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applications. The perceived inconsistency arose from the fact that
section 309(a) not only gave the Commission authority to grant applications without a hearing, but also gave applicants the right to a
hearing before denial of their applications. 6 Because the granting of
one application necessarily precluded the granting of those applications with which it was mutually exclusive, Justice Douglas felt that
the statutory hearing on such applications would become an
"empty thing."7 As the second applicant, Ashbacker would have
had to persuade the Commission to revoke the grant to Fetzer before its own application could have been granted. The Court thus
concluded that "[b]y the grant of the Fetzer application petitioner
has been placed under a greater burden than if its hearing had
been earlier."8 The Court sought to limit its decision to one procedural issue and held that "where two bona fide applications are
mutually exclusive the grant of one without a hearing to both deprives the loser of the opportunity which Congress chose to give
him."9 In attempting to provide the Commission with a means to
diminish the impact of the decision, Justice Douglas noted that
"[a]pparently no regulation exist[ed] which, for orderly administra~'
tion, requir[ed] an application for a frequency, previously applied.
for, . . . to be filed within a certain date. "10
Ashbacker has become a basic tenet of federal administrative
procedure but its application has resulted in a rule which is often
too broad for broadcast licenses, let alone for other regulatory purposes. First, although the Court attempted to limit its decision to
the facts before it, it failed to do so. Fundamentally, the Court
confronted a very simple issue: Did the Commission abuse its discretion in failing to consolidate the Fetzer and Ashbacker applications for a hearing before expressing a preference for one over the
other? As the Court noted briefly, the Commission had a procedure for discretionary consolidation of mutually exclusive applications;l1 indeed, the Commission's use of discretion may have been
6. 326 U.S. at 329-30.

7. Id. at 330. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argued that these restrictions
rendered the hearing "barren" and a "mere formality." Id. at 337, 339 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 332 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
9. Id. at 333.
10. Id. at 333 n.9. The regulations to which Justice Douglas alluded were subsequently promulgated. The current versions of these "cut-off" regulations are found
at 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.227(b)(1), 1.571(c), 1.591(b) (1977). See notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text infra.
11. 326 U.S. at 331 n.5. The regulations in effect at the time enabled the Com-
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a perfectly reasonable way of resolving the technical inconsistency
in the statute's language. In point of fact, the Commission may
have viewed Ashbacker's application as a dilatory tactic directed
against a potential competitor by an incumbent licensee and attempted to deal with it summarily. This may have been a reasonable approach, but not one which the Commission could argue
very forcefully on appeal, having failed to raise the issue below.
Second, the ultimate effect of the Court's decision was to give
incumbents an opportunity to "sandbag" potential competitors.
After Ashbacker, existing broadcasters could simply file applications
which would create exclusivity problems. The resulting hearing and
appeal could easily consume several years 12-a possibility which
the Court apparently did not anticipate. The Ashbacker doctrine
may make perfectly good sense as a means of resolving a contest
between newcomers, or between incumbents wishing to change facilities, since it would not, under such circumstances, delay the entry of a potential competitor. However, in a contest between an
incumbent and a newcomer, the doctrine inherently favors the
incumbent by allowing it to remain in operation until the conflict
is resolved. 13
Finally, the Court did not-and reasonably could not-foresee
that technological changes would make comparative hearings inappropriate for at least some types of licenses. As will be noted later,
however, the last few decades have witnessed some sweeping technological changes within the broadcast media. 14
The Ashbacker doctrine thus arose in a context which was not
ideal for the Commission's long-range policy decisionmaking. Indeed, the Court may have precipitated quite unintended results by
providing a new rationale for restricting entry into, and new
technology for, broadcasting. And the lower federal courts may
have compounded this effect by being overly enthusiastic in finding
instances of mutual exclusivity.

II. PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCTRINE
The terms of any basic doctrine inevitably raise secondary issues which, in tum, affect the meaning of the doctrine itself.
mission to "consolidate for hearing ... any applications which ... present conflict·
ing claims of the same nature" when "such action [would] best conduce to the
proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice." ld.
12. Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See
also W. JONES, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 144·54 (1962).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976).
14. See text accompanying notes 92·110 infra.
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Ashbacker has been no exception to this process. Indeed, the
Court has given little guidance since its original decision.
A.

Bona Fide Applications
The first task confronting an agency is to determine what constitutes a bona fide application within the meaning of Ashbacker.
At least four distinct issues arise: (1) has an application been filed
solely for the purpose of preventing the Commission from acting
upon another and otherwise unopposed application; (2) is an application timely filed for comparative consideration; (3) if timely filed,
does an application sufficiently conform to statutory and administrative processing requirements; and (4) if the application does not
conform, what effect should be given to a request for waiver of the
standards?
In order to preserve the integrity of its processes, any agency
will naturally seek to prevent the filing of applications designed
solely to delay the granting of other applications. Whether an application is so intended is, however, essentially a factual question
and does not raise significant theoretical issues. 15
The Communications Act sets forth requirements for applications for new broadcast stations;16 and the Commission has supplemented these statutory requirements with regulations. 17 In order to
obtain the information necessary to evaluate an applicant's qualifi-

15. See, e.g., Grenco, Inc., 28 F.C.C.2d 166, 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 560 (1971).
In Grenco, the Commission offered certain guidelines to be utilized in determining
whether an application is a "strike" application-one filed with the "motive or purpose ... to obstruct or delay another application." Id. at 167, 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F)
at 562. The guidelines suggested by the Commission include the timing of th.e application, the good faith of the applicant, and the "economic and competitive benefit"
accruing to the applicant from the application. Id., 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 562. In
order to comprehend the nature of this inquiry, it is necessary to understand that the
problem is one of resolving a factual question and that "each particular set of circumstances must be individually examined since the matter of purpose or motive
cannot be Scientifically defined." Id., 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 562. More recently,
however, the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that the Commission should
clarify its standards concerning rejection of "strike" applications. See Faulkner Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 557 F.2d 866, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1970). For factors relevant to the Commission's review of
an application, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 310, 313 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
The Commission employs a two-step licensing procedure in which a construction
permit is issued initially and a license is issued only after completion of construction
in accordance with the terms of the construction permit. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(a), 319
(1970). In all but the most unusual circumstances, the station license will be issued.
As a result, almost all controversies arise while issuance of the construction permit is
under consideration.
17. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.37,73.24 (1977).
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cations, the Commission requires that such applications be filed on
FCC Form 301. 18 To acquire Ashbacker rights, it is necessary to file
a Form 301; mere notification of an intention to file is insufficient. 19
Indeed, until an application is filed, a prospective applicant lacks
standing. 2o If the Commission waives its internal procedural rules
and grants an earlier application in less time than might reasonably
be anticipated, a normally timely application is not entitled to consideration. 21
Pressure therefore exists to file an application speedily in
order to acquire Ashbacker rights as soon as possible. This creates
the temptation to file a pro forma application and later amend it to
correct any defects-or even to file a defective application in order
to delay a potential competitor. To protect itself from this possibility, the Commission's rules allow it to dismiss a patently defective
application either before or after acceptance for filing. 22 In practice, the Commission exercises discretion in accepting or rejecting
defective applications. While the Commission may reject an application which fails to satisfy its requirements,23 it may, for example,
accept one which does not satisfy the statutory verification requirement. 24 This use of discretion seems to protect both the
18. 47 C.F.R. § 1.533(a)(1) (1977).
19. Federal Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560, 566-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955). Cf. Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 66
F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (failure to formally apply for a permit will deprive a
party of an appealable interest with respect to an FRC order; mere intention to apply
is insufficient).
20. Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 66 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir.
1933).
21. Federal Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560, 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955).
22. 47 C.F.R. § 1.566(a) (1977). In Commission practice, an application is first
"tendered" for filing. If acceptable, the application is later accepted as of the date of
tender. This procedure results in public notice of the filing of new applications prior
to examination for patent defects and thus expedites action on applications found to
be acceptable. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.564 (1977).
23. For example, in UMSJ, Inc., 8 F.C.C.2d 533, 10 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 404
(1967), the Commission refused to consider an application which it deemed to be
unacceptable. The Commission reasoned that before an applicant could acquire any
rights entitling it to consideration, its application "must be acceptable for filing." ld.,
10 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 405. Failure to maintain the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable applications would tend to encourage "strike" applications.
ld., 10 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 405. See note 15 supra.
24. Johnson Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In
Johnson, the court noted that although an unverified document could not be acted
upon, it could nevertheless be accepted, and the "initial failure to verify [could] be
cured by later verification." ld.
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Commission's processes and the interests of applicants who suffer
inadvertent mishaps after making reasonable attempts to comply
with the Commission's requirements. 25
A more difficult problem is created by a patently defective application coupled with a request for waiver based upon a claim of
"good cause." In order to preserve the rights of parties who are
willing to speculate on this type of approach, the Commission's
rules permit acceptance of a patently defective application if it is
accompanied by a showing in support of waiver.26 The Commission
can then dispose of the waiver request and application in at least
three ways: (1) grant the waiver and keep the application on file; (2)
order a hearing as to whether the waiver should be granted; or (3)
deny the waiver and dismiss the application. No matter how the
Commission disposes of the waiver request, its exercise of discretion normally cannot be challenged; after all, it need not conduct a
useless hearing. 27 When a defective application requires a waiver,
it does not acquire Ashbacker rights unless the waiver is granted. 28
Similarly, a hearing on a waiver request gives a party only provisional Ashbacker rights pending the waiver decision. 29
The status of "contingent" applications presents an interesting
example of waiver problems, even though Ashbacker rights may
not always be involved. The typical case arises when A files an
application to modify its station license for operation on a new frequency, resulting in abandonment of its old frequency if the application is granted; B then files an application for A's original frequency, contingent upon a grant of A's application. 3o B can acquire
no rights against A's initial operation;31 and pending satisfaction of
25. See B.J. Hart, 20 RAD. REG. (P&F) 301 (1960), where applicant's attorney was
permitted to file nunc pro tunc in order to supply essential material inadvertently
left on a desk when the application was tendered.
26. 47 C.F.R. § 1.566(a) (1977).
27. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956), the
Court stated that "[we] do not think Congress intended the Commission to waste
time on applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing."
28. See Petersburg Television Corp., No. 61-800 (F.C.C. 1961).
29. E.g., St. Louis Telecast, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 625, 626-27 n.2, 710, 12 RAD. REG.
(P&F) 1289, 1294-95 n.2, 1366 (1955).
30. By filing a contingent application, an applicant may shorten the time that action on its application is delayed once the frequency becomes available since applications are normally processed by file number in order of filing. See 47 C.F.R. §
1.571(c) (1977). The Commission sometimes tolerates this procedure in order to protect the public from the loss of service which might otherwise result.
31. It should be noted that Ashbacker rights can be acquired by filing a competing application against an application for renewal of a license. E.g., Hearst Radio,
Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 6 RAD. REG. (P&F) 994 (1951); 47 C.F.R. § 1.227(b)(6) (1977).
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the contingency, B's application does not receive Ashhacker rights
as against the applications of third parties. 32 Even if the contingency is ultimately resolved, B does not acquire a preferred
status vis-a-vis later-filed applications. 33

B.

Matters of Definition
When two applications are filed for the same frequency and
location, they are obviously exclusive. However, few cases present
such clear-cut facts. More typically, applications propose stations at
some distance from each other, so that a grant of competing applications would not physically preclude both operations, although
each station might be required to operate at less than maximum
efficiency. (As normally used in Ashbacker situations, "mutual
exclusivity" and "preclusion" are conclusions of law3 4 that a grant of
one application would bar a grant of another.)
Since an agency's finding of mutual exclusivity amounts to a
conclusion of law, the reasons supporting such a finding vary in
different types of administrative practice. 35 In the broadcast field,
three types of situations, other than electrical interference, often
lead to a finding of actual exclusivity: (1) mutual economic exclusivity resulting from the limited size of the station's market; (2)
exclusivity due to circumstances beyond the Commission's control;
and (3) exclusivity arising through the operation of the Commission's rules.
Broadcasters have recently been concerned with the possibility of losing a broadcast
license through such a procedure. From the standpoint of this discussion, challenges
at renewal time do not warrant separate consideration. A full history of the subject is
available in E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 112 (1973).
32. Northside Broadcasting Corp., 14 F.C.C. 57, 58, 4 RAD. REG. (P&F) 411,
412-13 (1949). A discussion of similar treatment of contingent applications at the
Civil Aeronautics Board is contained in Note, The Ashbacker Rule and the CAB:
Cumbersome Procedure v. Public Interest, 44 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1151 (1958).
33. Jack Gross Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 80, 8i, 3 RAD. REG. (P&F) 1340, 1342
(1947). The Commission noted that its practice is not to consider these contingent
applications until the contingency has been resolved. "The purpose of this practice
. . . is to avoid giving any particular applicant, or applicants, an undue advantage
over other applicants who may wish to apply for the frequency to be vacated." Id.
34. These findings are referred to as conclusions of law in the sense that determinations regarding acceptable levels of interference are reached by application of
the Commission's rules.
35. For example, the most significant possibility for mutual exclusivity which has
developed in the field of aeronautics arises from economic factors. See Duggan, The
Ashbacker Doctrine and Proceedings Before the Civil Aeronautics Board, 46 GEO.
L.J. 282, 294 (1957); Note, The Ashbacker Rule and the CAB: Cumbersome Procedure v. Public Interest, 44 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1958).
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Mutual economic exclusivity is relatively rare in broadcasting.
It deserves mention, however, to avoid confusion with the somewhat similar and far more common Carroll 36 situation in which an
existing station seeks protection from the adverse economic impact
of a new station in its market. Although similar to Ashbacker, Carroll problems involve petitions to deny the granting of a license
rather than those involving competing applications; only the new
application may be granted or denied and there is generally no
claim that both stations cannot survive even though one will be injured. 37 Mutual economic exclusivity arises when there are two applications for different frequencies in the same location-both of
which could be granted from an engineering standpoint-but where
consolidation is requested on the ground that an area lacks sufficient revenue to support both stations. 38 In practical terms, this
situation rarely arises because a second applicant would likely consider a venture too risky if there were any indication that a market
might not be able to support two stations. Tactical considerations
may lead the second applicant to propose an operation which wQuld
generate electrical interference with the first station in order to
guarantee a comparative hearing. 39 This stance also may have the
attraction of shortening the delay before the second application is
considered. 40
A second and rare type of mutual exclusiVity arises when circumstances beyond the Commission's control militate against granting more than one application. For example, in Chronicle Publish-

36. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
37. ld. at 442. It should be noted that the critical factor in Carroll situations is the
totality of service in the area and not economic harm to the broadcaster. ld. at 443.
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-76 (1940). For further
discussion of Carroll, see Mayer, Sanders Brothers Revisited: Protection of Broadcasters from the Consequences of Economic Competition, 49 Ky. L.J. 370 (1961);
Givens, Refusal of Radio and Television Licenses on Economic Grounds, 46 VA. L.
REv. 1391 (1960).
38. This problem may also involve Carroll considerations in some situations,
such as those which would arise between an application for renewal of a license and
an application for a construction permit for a new broadcast station. E.g., K-six Television, Inc., 2 F.C.C.2d 1021, 7 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 128 (1966). It is also desirable
to distinguish the recurring situations in which competing technologies (for example,
cable television versus over-the-air teleVision) are involved; traditional Ashbacker
doctrine presupposes the same technology.
39. The criteria applied in comparative hearings are not directly relevant to
Ashbacker problems. See Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1971).
40. Compare the discussion in note 30 supra.
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CO.,41 airspace approval was available for only one of the two
towers proposed by each applicant.42 Even if the Commission
granted both applications, the distinct possibility existed that only
one of the two stations could actually be constructed. 43 Recognizing the mutual exclusivity inherent in airspace considerations, the
FCC denied one of the applications and thus effectively permitted
its decision to be controlled by the actions of a third party.
The Commission's own rules create the third and most significant type of mutual exclusivity. To he sure, the Commission's
rulemaking powers44 allow it to avoid Ashbacker problems in some
services by employing devices such as assigning frequencies on a
non-exclusive basis. 45 But this approach is of little practical help in
broadcasting46 because stations must be on the air for many hours
with maximum power. The Commission thus approaches broadcast
interference problems by determining tolerable interference limits
and authorizing stations to operate within them. 47 The two most
important determinants of a station's signal strength are the frequency on which it operates and the amount of power with which
it transmits. An additional factor which complicates the problem of
placing stations is that signals interfere with those on adjacent frequencies and even with those on harmonic frequencies 48-i.e., frequencies which are multiples of a station's frequency. An allocations system thus must limit a station's power and maintain
minimum mileage separations between stations on the same fre-

ing

41. No. 59-407 (F.C.C. 1959).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 303(q) (1970) gives the Commission authority to deny applications
which propose to use towers which constitute a hazard to air navigation. E.g., Simmons v. FCC, 145 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The Commission has established procedures for coordinating its jurisdiction in this area with the various aeronautical
interests. 47 C.F.R. §§ 17.4, 17.7, 17.8, 17.10, 17.48, 17.49 (1977).
43. Of course, an applicant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether its
proposed tower would constitute a hazard to air navigation. See, e.g., Maine Radio
and Television Co., No. 61-68 (F.C.C. 1961).
44. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(f), 303(r) (1970).
45. For example, 47 C.F.R. § 74.402(e) (1977) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[rJemote pickup broadcast stations or systems will not be granted exclusive frequency assignments. The same frequency or frequencies may be assigned to other
licensees in the same area."
46. 47 U.S.C. § 153(0) (1970) defines broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations." The principal broadcast services are standard (AM), frequency modulation (FM), and television broadcast (TV).
47. For a discussion of the technical aspects of broadcast interference problems,
see H. HEAD, WAVE PROPAGATION AND INTERFERENCE EFFECTS IN THE TELEVISION BROADCAST BANDS (1961).
48. 47 C.F.R. § 73.698, Table IV (1977).
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quency and/or related frequencies. Problems of mutual exclusivity
are thus not confined to stations which operate on the same frequency; they also may involve stations on different but electrically
related frequencies.
The Commission has employed two basic approaches in placing stations: first, it establishes the areas in which frequencies may
be used; and second, it creates standards for sites from which to
operate. The Commission has selected the option of predetermining allocations in the television and FM- services with apparently
satisfactory results.49 The "you find it/we grant it" system has been
utilized in AM broadcasting, largely fot the historical reason that
there were already 732 stations in operation when the Federal
Radio Commission was established. 50 The existence of so many stations persuaded the Commission not to attempt to regroup existing
stations. 51
The present television allocation scheme is based upon a "Table of Assignments"52 which specifies the available television channels53 in each market. 54 An applicant must be able to locate a proposed station in order to provide its principal community with a
signal of at least a minimum intensity. 55 Other stations on electrically related frequencies generally are prohibited from locating
transmitters at less than specified distances from this site. 56 If no
co-channel station has been proposed-i.e., no specific transmitter
site exists to determine distances-the Commission fixes "reference
49. See Sixth Report on Television Allocations, 1 RAD. REG. (P&F), Part 3, at
91:601 (1952). The Sixth Report concluded a four-year rule making proceeding by
establishing the present system of television allocations.
50. FRC ANN. REP. 2 (1927). The Federal Radio Commission was established by
the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), and was the
predecessor to the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 603,604 (1970).
51. The Federal Radio Commission did, however, reassign frequencies at the
existing station sites in order to lessen interference. FRC ANN. REP. 8 (1927).
52. E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.606 (1977). FM allocation employs a similar approach
which, in the interest of brevity, will not be discussed herein.
53. These are frequency bands defined in 47 C.F.R. § 73.603(a) (1977).
54. A certain amount of flexibility is added by permitting the selection of a principal community within 15 miles of the community listed in the Table. 47 C.F.R. §
73.607(b) (1977).
55. 47 C.F.R. § 73.685(a) (1977).
56. rd. § 73.610 (1977). It should be noted that two applications which both comply with these rules may still be filed for sites which fail to meet the required separation and thus result in mutual exclusivity. Of course, in unusual circumstances,
the Commission may conduct a hearing in order to determine whether a minor
waiver of the separation requirement should be granted. See Nathan Frank, 20 RAD.
REG. (P&F) 806, 808 (1960).
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points" which prevent location of a new station unreasonably close
to any vacant assignments. 57 These mileage separations and the
power and antenna height limitations are a station's only protection
against interference from other stations;58 a certain amount of negligible interference is built into the system.
An example illustrates the relatively limited potential for
Ashbacker problems under the television or FM allocations system.
Assume that channels 3 and 6 are assigned to a community in the
Table of Assignments. Since, under present rules, television and
FM applicants cannot propose their own frequencies and are also
limited to one facility per market, A and B could file applications
for channel 3, while C and D could file applications for channel 6;59
A and B would be mutually exclusive, while C and D would be
mutually exclusive. 6o As a result, two relatively simple comparative
proceedings would allow the Commission to award both channels. 61
The electrical propagation characteristics of AM signals involve
a number of factors which are not present in television broadcasting. 62 In essence, the AM allocation system seeks to ensure that a
station has a normally protected contour against electrical interfer57. 47 C.F.R. § 73.611 (1977).
58. Id. § 73.612(a) (1977).
59. The Commission's procedural rules prevent a party from filing applications
for more than one television channel in a particular community. 47 C.F.R. § 1.516(a)
(1977). In the past, the Commission's procedures allowed applications for more than
one channel to be filed, with the practical result that comparative television hearings
were more complex. See, e.g., KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 177 F.2d 40 (D.C.
Cir.1949).
60. 47 C.F.R. § 1.572(d) (1977). Nonetheless, any of the applicants could allege
the existence of economic mutual exclusivity as a basis for consolidation of the two
proceedings. Cf. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per
curiam) (allegation of mutual exclusivity by one applicant entitles it to a preliminary
hearing on the issue of exclusivity or a comparative hearing).
61. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that two two-party proceedings
would be easier to conclude than one four-party proceeding. Of course, to the extent
that comparative hearings are expected to produce the best qualified applicants, it
would seem more sensible to combine the proceedings in order to be sure of selecting the two best qualified applicants of the four. Cf. Azalea Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 561,
563,22 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 909, 911-12 (1971) (public interest best served by having
as many qualified applicants as possible compete for each broadcast facility). Compare note 59 supra.
62. For example, standard broadcast signals depend on "sky waves," which are
reflected by the ionized layers of the stratosphere to areas not directly served by a
station. Since the degree of ionization depends on sunlight, the characteristics of the
signals broadcast may vary according to the time of day or night. This, in turn, requires that stations be divided into categories in a manner not necessary to television
broadcast. (The reader interested in a clearer picture of the outline of standard
broadcast allocation may consult 47 C.F.R. § 73.183-190 (1977).)

1978]

BROADCAST REGULATION

473

ence from other stations. 63 In selecting a site and frequency for an
AM station, an applicant thus must use a site from which its frequency will not interfere with stations on the same or adjacent frequencies and which will not receive an unreasonable amount of
interference within its own proposed service area. 64
As a result of this allocation system, two problems exist in
AM broadcasting. First, section 307(b) of the Communications Act
requires the Commission to "make such distribution of licenses,
frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several
States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of the same. "65 This statutory
directive rarely creates difficulties in television or FM regulation
since the rulemaking mechanism underlying the Table of Assignments generally satisfies the requirements of section 307(b).66
However, since AM site allocation is not covered by the Table of
Assignments,67 individual applicants make the first proposal for
service in a given area. Under these circumstances, section 307(b)
considerations may result in the threshold disqualification of an applicant without a comparative hearing if it fails to propose appropriate service. 68 However, in cases where noncompliance with section 307(b) requirements is less apparent, such considerations may
63. This statement is subject to technical qualifications beyond the scope of this
Article.
64. E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.37 (1977).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970).
66. Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
See also Coastal Bend Television Co. v. FCC, 234 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In any
case, the Commission is free to avoid the section 307(b) issue at the rulemaking stage
and defer it for subsequent adjudication. E.g., New Orleans Deintermixture Case, 22
F.C.C. 396, 403, 15 RAD. REG. (P&F) 1603, 1611 (1957).
67. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
68. CJ. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1955) (decision in favor of one applicant over the other on the basis of community need, where
each applicant sought to serve a different community, is proper even in the absence
of a preliminary finding that both are equally able to serve their respective communities).
The Commission has experienced difficulty in insuring that AM service is both
"efficient" and "equitable," as is apparently required by section 307(b). This type of
conflict may arise where the most efficient allocation of frequencies, motivated by
the purpose of providing service to the greatest area and population possible, is incompatible with the "equitable" goal of providing a local radio station to each separate and distinct community. When such a conflict arises in a proceeding involVing
competing applications for the same frequency, the Commission is likely to give
greater weight to the goal of equitable allocation of frequencies. See Cohen & Russo,
The Anomaly in Section 307(b) oj the Communications Act oj 1934, 11 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 202, 202-03 (1960).
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not permit the denial of a comparative hearing. 69
A second and administratively more troublesome problem involves the "linking" of competing applications. An example of linking would arise if two applicants proposed new stations in the same
community on frequencies of 1200 kilohertz and 1260 kilohertz,
and a third applicant then filed for 1230 kilohertz-which is adjacent to both 1200 kilohertz and 1260 kilohertz. The third application would link the two other applications since each would be
mutually exclusive with the proposed operation on 1230 kilohertz.
The Commission thus would need to designate all three applications for a hearing in order to determine which one to grant. At
one time, linking created serious administrative difficulties since
the filing of only a few applications could create a linking problem
and require hearings for several different parties. 70 The problems
would be more complicated if the links were filed after the other
applications had already been processed. 71 As discussed below,
however, the "cut-off" rules now limit problems of linking. 72
III. ATTEMPTS To CONTAIN ASHBACKER
The Commission has developed a variety· of procedural devices
to limit Ashbacker's impact on its processes. Several approaches
merit brief discussion even though they cannot be adapted to all
situations. First, the Commission is sometimes able to assign frequencies on a non-exclusive basis, thereby authorizing their use by
all who wish to share them. 73
Second, in order to facilitate new service to the public despite
delays in reaching a final decision, the Commission may issue a
"Special Temporary Authorization" (STA) during the pendency of a
comparative hearing to allow one or more of the parties to conduct
an interim operation on the contested frequency.74 STAs are usually subject to the express condition that the interim operator's investment and performance be irrelevant to the Commission's later
comparative evaluation of the applications. At first, this procedure
69. ld. at 206, 209-10.
70. FCC ANN. REP. 64 (1959).
71. AM Processing Procedure, 26 F.C.C. 369, 370, 18 RAn. REG. (P&F) 1565,
1566 (1959).
72. See text accompanying notes 84 & 85 infra.
73. See note 45 supra.
74. See Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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was approved as being consistent with Ashbacker,75 but was later
limited in C01Jununity Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 76 In tones reminiscent of Ashbacker, then-Judge Burger stated that "the grant
of temporary authority to one of several competing applicants before there has been [a comparative] hearing" is an "extraordinary
procedure" which is "pregnant with danger to truly comparative
consideration. "77 He emphasized that the interim operator, if not
ultimately chosen, could lose a substantial amount of money.
Burger thus feared that a Commission of "mortal men" would be
tempted-albeit unwillingly-to favor the interim operator in its
final decision. 78 The court distinguished COllununity Broadcasting
from prior cases on the ground that the public had already received
service from another station79 and therefore had less need for an
interim operation. The court suggested that the grant of an STA
was held to be an appropriate procedure in prior cases only where
"the public interest ... overbalance[d] the possible disadvantages
"80

After this setback, the Commission amended its rules to allow
joint interim operations provided all of the applicants for a facility
are afforded an opportunity to participate. 81 But this approach also
has inherent problems; it may provide an incentive to file applications merely to share an interim operation's profits, or it may encourage parties to stall in order to continue receiving revenues
from an interim operation if they are not confident of winning.
Two other approaches to the Ashbacker problem deserve brief
mention, even though they are of limited utility. First, where frequencies are freely available and the grant of an application will not
preclude a subsequent applicant from receiving a comparable facility, it may be feasible to grant the first qualified application without having an Ashbacker hearing. 82 Second, the Commission will,
with the consent of all parties and on the basis of the applications,
75. See Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir.
1953).
76. 274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
77. ld. at 758-59.
78. ld. at 759.
79. ld. at 761 n.6.
80. ld. at 758. See also Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286
(D.C. Cir. 1953), where the grant of an STA was approved because it was "designed
to preserve the only existing service" in the area. ld. at 288.
81. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.592(b) (1977).
82. Fostering Expanded Use of UHF Television Channels, No. 61-993 (F.C.C.
1961).
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make its decision without a hearing. 83 Unfortunately, the use of this
procedure is apt to be inversely proportionate to the anticipated
value of the facilities at issue.
The most effective limitation on Ashbacker problems is the
"cut-off' rule. 84 This provides that the Commission give notice of
pending applications and the time within which competing applications may be filed. No new applications are accepted during the
course of the comparative proceeding. This procedure is responsive
to Justice Douglas' comment in Ashbacker regarding "orderly ad·
ministration. "85 It obviously does not solve all problems, but it re·
duces the delays which can confront competing applications. 86
If an application is procedurally complete, the Commission has
little capacity to prevent it from being used to harass potential
competitors. 87 Precisely because the Commission's hands are tied,
relief ultimately may come from the Sherman Act88 rather than the
Communications Act. To be sure, traditional learning taught that a
section 2 action would not lie against a party's use of agency pro·
cesses to delay a competitor's entry.89 But more recent cases indi·
83. 47 C.F.R. § 1.603 (1977). A variation on this theme-as suggested in numerous proposals-would be to grant licenses by an auction or a lottery. E.g., Botein,
Comparative Broadcast Licensing and the Rule of Law: A Fuller InVest/gat/on, 6
GA. L. REv. 743 (1972).
84. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.227(b)(1), 1.571(c), 1.591(b) (1977).
85. 326 U.S. at 333 n.9. See note 10 supra.
86. See Century Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 310 F.2d 864, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Ranger v. FCC, 294 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ridge Radio Corp. v. FCC, 292
F,.2d 770, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
87. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
89. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
145 (1961), the Supreme Court reversed a judgment granting damages and injunctive
relief to a trucking firm. The complaint alleged that railroad companies had conspired to destroy competition in the long-distance freight business by advocating that
the Pennsylvania Governor exercise his veto power over a legislative enactment that
would have increased truck weight limits. Justice' Black, writing for a unanimous
Court, stated that:
[T]he starting point for our consideration of the case ... [is] that no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws .... [I]t has been held that where
a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of a valid governmental
action, ... no violation of the Act can be made out. These decisions rest
upon the fact that under our form of government the question whether a law
of that kind should pass, or if passed be enforced, is the responsibility of the
appropriate legislative or executive branch of government so long as the law
itself does not violate some provision of the Constitution.
Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51
(1943); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939). Thus, filing
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cate that an abuse of agency process to prevent new entry is actionable. 90 Under section 1, a plaintiff presumably would be required
to show that other broadcasters agreed to oppose its application for
frivolous reasons; under section 2, that a single competitor possessed dominant market power. If these preconditions are satisfied,
it may be possible to recover against a sham applicant for treble
damages.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF ASHBACKER ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Ashbacker creates problems not only in the regulation of conventional broadcast media, but also in the Commission's treatment
of new technologies. The doctrine creates a procedural strait jacket
for any type of "broadcasting" under Title III of the Communications Act; if mutual exclusivity exists, the Commission has no
choice but to hold a lengthy and expensive hearing. 91 In its regulation of subscription television (STV), the Commission seems to
have locked itself precisely into this bind.
STV is one of several methods of transmitting programs to
home viewers on a "pay" basis. Under the existing regulations, stations operating on frequencies listed in the television Table of Assignments are permitted to allocate a portion of their time to nonSTV broadcasting. 92 Although the technology for STV has existed
an application for the purpose of harasSing a potential competitor would not constiture an actionable restraint of trade inasmuch as the hearing process is a "valid
governmental action" for the purpose of enforcing the Communications Act.
90. In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972),
the Court exempted from the Noerr holding antitrust claims alleging conspiracy to
"bar ... competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals ... so [as] to
usurp [the] decisionmaking process." Id. at 512. If a litigant could show a pattern of
baseless claims which had the effect of barring access to an agency or court, then a
valid antitrust action could be made out. Id.
91. See, e.g., Digital Paging Sys., Inc., _
F.C.C.2d _
(Aug. 29, 1978), \yhere
the Commission considered mutually exclusive applications for the right to construct
a Multipoint Distribution Service facility. Board Member Kessler, in a concurring
opinion, suggested that the requirements of section 309 and Ashbacker ought to be
relaxed when "fledgling industr[ies)" are involved and proposed less formal hearings
or a lottery as alternative methods of resolving such conflicts. In her closing remarks,
after noting that more than thirty years had elapsed since Ashbacker, she stated that
"it is now ... a new era where on the basis of criticisms of the comparative hearing
process in broadcast cases by some members of the judiciary, it cannot be said that it
would be impossible for them to revisit Ashbacker on the basis (a) of a newly developing industry, (b) of the Commission's past experience with the comparative
formal hearing process, and (c) of their own experience." Id. at __ (Kessler, Board
Member, concurring).
92. 47 C.F.R. § 73.643(e) (1977). STY thus differs from "pay" cable television in
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since the early 1960's, the Commission, at the urging of Congress,
delayed its authorization until 1968. 93 In adopting final rules, the
Commission attempted to ensure that STV would supplement
rather than supplant non-STV programming. 94 An applicant for
an STV authorization thus must show that at least five other television broadcast stations operate in its market, that there is no
other station carrying STV in operation, and that the applicant
will meet the Commission's standards for minimum amounts of
programming. 95 Only recently has the Commission even proposed
the adoption of STV cut-off rules. 96
The Commission, with the approval of the District of Columbia Circuit,97 was quick to classifY STV as a form of broadcasting, 98
and gave little thought to the procedural consequences under
Ashbacker. This classification of conventional television and STV as
the same type of broadcast television would seem to generate the
need for a hearing in at least three distinct situations. First, a hearing appears to be necessary on two or more applications for stations
with STV proposals for the same frequency and location. 99 Since
neither party is an incumbent, procedural fairness would demand
that they have an opportunity to test each other's claims.
The rules also seem to require a hearing between an applicant
for a station with STV and an applicant for a station without
STV.100 At first glance, this approach seems to have some validity
that the latter does not use broadcast frequencies to reach home viewers. 47 C.F.R. §
76.5 (1977).
93. See Subscription Television, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466,
469-72, 14 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 1601, 1605-09 (1968).
94. 43 Fed. Reg. 1516, 1517 (1978) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R., Part 73). The
Commission has concluded that STY may provide u a beneficial supplement to the
conventional television programming and that, as an alternative medium, it might
well provide a wholesome stimulus to free television which could lead to an improvement in overall programming available to the public." [d.
95. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642 (1977).
96. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1516, 1518 (1978) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R., Part 73).
97. National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
98. See Subscription Television, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 472,
14 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 1601, 1609 (1968).
99. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(a) (1977). Ashbacker problems arise because this regulation permits only one STY authorization per community. Therefore, if several STV
applications are filed for anyone community, they are necessarily mutually exclusive. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1516, 1518 (1978) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R., Part 73). The
Commission has also acknowledged that, as yet, there are no criteria for comparing
mutually exclusive STY applications, but has given notice of its intention to propose
regulations. [d. at 1519.
100. Additional complications arise because an applicant for an STY license is
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since both applications would be requesting the same-and a mutually exclusive-frequency and location. But in this situation, the
Commission's rules could effectively give a preference to the application for a non-STY station. The rules require an applicant for an
STV station to show that it will have the same minimum amounts
of "public service" programming as an applicant for a non-STY station. lOl This places an STV applicant in the classic "Catch 22" situation. It cannot possibly promise as much "public service" programming as an applicant for a non-STV station since, by definition, it
proposes to reserve a substantial amount of its broadcast day for pay
programs. Unless the Commission retreats from its traditional consideration of "proposed programming" in comparative hearings l02
-which it has shown no inclination to do-an STV applicant operates under an inherent disadvantage.
Finally, Ashbacker may require a hearing between two STV
applications for different frequencies and locations if they arguably
create mutual economic exclusivity. Although the Commission initially authorized only one STV station in an area, it later interpreted the rules to allow two or more stations in the same "market" if located in different "communities" within that market. lo3 In
the past, the Commission generally has dealt with mutual economic
exclusivity in the context of petitions to deny rather than in the
context of comparative hearings. lo4 However, there seems to be at
least some impetus toward considering economic exclusivity in the
comparative context. 105
required either to hold a broadcasting license or a construction pennit or to be an
applicant for a construction pennit. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(a) (1977). As the FCC has
recognized, this regulation "can confuse matters in a comparative situation." 43 Fed.
Reg. 1516, 1519 (1978). The Commission is aware that, under the current regulations,
unless all of the related applications are consolidated, undesirable results may
occur-e.g., an applicant may be granted one application and not the other, thereby
receiving a license he does not want or cannot use. At the same time, an application
for a non-STY station which would ordinarily have been granted would be denied
because it had conflicted with the application which was granted. Id. If, however, an
applicant makes it "unmistakably clear" that it is only applying for a conventional
station because of its desire to obtain an STY license, the Commission will consolidate the applications. Midwest St. Louis, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 203, 205, 38 RAD. REG.
2d (P&F) 569, 572 (1976).
101. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(b) (1977).
102. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397, 5
RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1901, 1911 (1965).
103. Subscription Television Authorizations, 55 F.C.C.2d 187, 192, 34 RAD. REG.
2d (P&F) 1145, 1152 (1975).
104. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
105. Midwest St. Louis, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 203, 38 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 569 (1976).
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The Commission's application of Ashbacker to STV may thus
raise a number of problems since it will, at best, serve to complicate an already complex decisionmaking process. The Commission
could, of course, escape from its own procedural pitfall by designating STV as a separate type of broadcast service. Hearings still
would be necessary on STV applications which were either technically or economically mutually exclusive with other STV applications.
V. CONCLUSION
The FCC's experience thus bears out Professor Davis' prediction of two decades ago that "the Ashbacker doctrine has a large
and complex nlture. "106 With that future now upon us, Ashbacker
does not seem to have enhanced the administrative process. The
Court formulated the doctrine to protect a party's right to participate in agency decisionmaking. Unfortunately, Ashbacker has too
often become a smokescreen for dilatory tactics and procedural
abuses.
An obvious corrective measure would be to limit tactics such
as linking.107 But this approach would still leave substantial room
for other abuses. As noted before, under Ashbacker an agency has
virtually no way of dismissing an application which is filed for the
purpose of harassing a potential competitor. lOS
In point of fact, Ashbacker and its progeny place the shoe on
the wrong foot in terms of ensuring fair agency procedures-that is,
with the agency rather than with the parties. Although applicants
obviously need fair procedures, an agency cannot operate effectively while under an absolute duty to consolidate.
Instead, agencies should be free to use one of their most basic
tools: discretion. The prospect of unbridled discretion is hardly attractive since it is obviously prone to abuse. But modern theories
concerning the administrative process have demonstrated that
structural control109 and judicial reviewllO can effectively control
administrative discretion. Thus, the time is ripe to reevaluate and
perhaps remove Ashbacker's rigid constraints.
106. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 8.12, at 576 (1958).
107. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
108. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
109. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELn.nNARY INQUIRY (1969).
1l0. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).

